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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
Use of Corporate Entity to Evade Contractual Obligations. Scott v.
McReynolds1 afforded the Court of Appeals an opportunity to pierce
the corporate veil. Plaintiff and defendant McReynolds were partners
in the business of selling butane-propane gas and appliances. In a con-
tract dissolving the partnership, McReynolds agreed not to sell gas or
appliances within a specified area. Shortly thereafter, the other de-
fendant, a corporation, was formed, and it sold gas within the exempted
area in competition with plaintiff. McReynolds was president of the
defendant corporation, was actively engaged in the business and was
a "prime mover in the organization of the corporation." He owned- 49
of the 100 shares of its capital stock and together with his wife owned
one-half of the entire stock. In a suit to enjoin McReynolds and the
corporation, one defense was that the corporation was not bound by
the contract in which McReynolds agreed not to compete. The Court
of Appeals affirmed an injunction running against both McReynolds
and the corporation.
While a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that
of its shareholders, the corporate entity privilege may not be used for
the purpose of evading contractual obligations. 2 Thus, if A agrees not
to compete with B in order to protect B in the purchase of the good
wii of A's business and A then organizes a corporation for the purpose
of conducting the same business under a corporate name, the separate
entity concept of the corporation will not insulate it from liability for
breach of A's contract.3 In the Massachusetts case of Berry v. Old
South Engraving Co.,4 a corporation, to escape a closed shop agreement,
was dissolved, and another corporation with the same shareholders and
directors was formed. The court held that the new corporation was not
bound by the closed shop agreement of its predecessor. That decision
brought forth some very caustic criticism from the leading authority
in the field of corporation law, Professor Ballentine. He commented:
"In most jurisdictions such a bare-faced evasion of a contractual obli-
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 255 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
2. See BALLENTiNE, CORPORATIONS § 130 (Rev. ed. 1946).
3. Blank v. Olcovich Shoe Corp., 20 Cal. App.2d 456, 67 P.2d 376 (1937);
Arctic Dairy v. Winans, 267 Mich. 80, 255 N.W. 290 (1934); Kramer v. Old, 119
N.C. 1, 25 S.E. 813 (1896); Dairy Co-operative Ass'n v. Brandes Creamery, 147
Ore. 488, 30 P.2d 338 (1934); cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood
Retinning Co., 104 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1939).
4. 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933). But cf. Packard Clothes, Inc. v. Direc-
tor of the Division of Employment Security, 318 Mass. 329, 61 N.E.2d 528 (1945),
where employment law benefits which had accrued to an individual also ac-
crued to a subsequently formed corporation.
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gation by the formation of a corporation to carry on the same business
would be regarded as a mere subterfuge and the abuse of the separate
corporate entity would be prevented."5 Professor Ballentine's observa-
tion seems entirely applicable to the conduct of the defendants in the
case at hand, and the overwhelming weight of authority supports the
Court in its decision. 6
Ultra Vires Contracts. In Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 7 the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court had something to say about the law of ultra vires
contracts made by a corporation. Keen and Scruggs, the two owners of
all the outstanding stock in Scruggs Equipment Co., had a disagree-
ment, and it was decided that one should buy the other out. Keen and
the plaintiff, an employee of Scruggs Equipment Co., entered into an
oral agreement whereby Keen, speaking for himself and the Scruggs
Equipment Co., promised plaintiff a certain contract if plaintiff would
assist Keen in purchasing the stock of the Scruggs Equipment Co. and
in conducting the business of the Company in the event Keen bought
out Scruggs. The contract which Keen promised plaintiff included,
among other things, a promise to let plaintiff have a certain number
of shares of Scruggs Equipment Co. stock. Plqintiff remained with the
Company, helped Keen buy the shares of the Company, helped retain
certain accounts and assisted in reorganizing the business. Plaintiff
thus carried out his part of the bargain, and Keen got the shares of the
Company, except a certain number of shares which the Company kept.
Then the Company and Keen refused to deliver the promised shares to
plaintiff, who sued both for breach of contract. A demurrer to the
plaintiff's bill of complaint interposed several defenses, which included
the defense that the contract was -ultra vires and void. The trial court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that, since the
corporation accepted the benefits of the performance of the contract
by plaintiff, the contract was not void. The Court thought that perhaps
the contract was not -ultra vires at all because of Keen's relationship
to the corporation, but that, even if it were ultra vires in its inception,
it had become enforceable by reason of plaintiff's performance.
In view of the very broad statutory grant of power given to ordinary
domestic corporations in Tennessee, the contract under which plaintiff
assisted in managing and reorganizing the defendant corporation in
exchange for the promise to sell him stock appears not to be a transac-
tion beyond the actual authority of the directors and representatives
of the corporation under the charter contract so as to warrant the con-
5. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 130 (Rev. ed. 1946).
6. See authorities cited in notes 2 and 3 supra.
7. 250 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1952). See the discussion of another aspect of this




demnation of ultra vires.8 After setting forth a wide compass of
powers granted to corporations, the Tennessee statute concludes with
this sweeping grant:
"To do all and everything necessary and proper for the accomplishment
of the objects enumerated in its certificate of incorporation or any amend-
ment thereof, or necessary or incidental to the protection and benefit of
the corporation, and in general to carry on any lawful business necessary
or incidental to the attainment of the objects of the corporation, whether
or not such business is similar in nature to the objects set forth in the
certificate of incorporation of such corporation or any amendment
thereof.... -9
Instead of a strictly ultra vires transaction, the Buice Court may have
been thinking of a contract which is apparently within the authorized
scope of the corporation's business but is actually unauthorized by rea-
son of extrinsic facts, such as the lack of authority of Keen to represent
the corporation. Such acts are not necessarily ultra vires; they may be
within the power of the corporation but not within the power of the
officers.10 While the courts often refer to such contracts as ultra vires,
all that is meant is that the particular officer had no power to make the
contract." In this class of cases, the question is merely one of agency,
and the decisions are governed by rules relating to agency. Conse-
quently, an estoppel to plead the officer's lack of authority may arise
where the other party to the contract is ignorant of the extrinsic facts
rendering the contract unauthorized.12 Moreover, in the present case,
any question of lack of authority of Keen to make the contract as an
agent of the corporation seems to be completely eliminated by reason
of the fact that the corporation could be said to have ratified the con-
tract, even if it were outside of Kedn's authority. Keen was the sole
shareholder, and he could be said to have ratified, assented to, or ac-
quiesced in the contract by receiving the performance of plaintiff.
3
Perhaps a word should be said concerning the observations of the
Court relative to the consequences which flow from an ultra vires con-
tract. Where an ultra vires contract is executory on one side only,
8. For authority for this meaning of ultra vires, as well as for a discussion
of the varied meanings of that term, see State v. Holston Trust Co., 168 Tenn.
546, 557, 79 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (1934); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 83, 89 (Rev.
ed. 1946); 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 3399 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 3722 (Williams 1934). As illustrative of the broad
scope of powers granted, see Nashville Breeko Block Co. v. Hopton, 29 Tenn.
App. 394, 196 S.W.2d 1010 (M.S. 1946), where a corporation organized to
manufacture blocks had power to build houses to demonstrate the blocks.
10. See Charles A. Hill & Co. v. Belmont Heights Baptist Church, 17 Tenn.
App. 603, 611, 69 S.W.2d 612, 617 (M.S. 1933); 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 340
(Perm. ed., Jones, 1931); cf. State v. Holston Trust Co., 168 Tenn. 546, 557,
79 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (1934).
11. 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 3401 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931).
12. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 97 (Rev. ed. 1946); 7 FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS, §§ 3548-3553 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931).
13. Martin v. Niagara Falls Vffg. Co., 122 N.Y. 165, 25 N.E. 303 (1890); BAL-
LENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 101 (Rev. ed. 1946).
1038 [ VOL. 6
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
having been fully performed on the other, Tennessee has been classi-
fied with that minority view which will not permit an action on the
contract against the corporation and which holds that the obligation,
if any, is quasi-contractual for the value of what has been received un-
der the contract.14 The majority view, on the other hand, holds that,
when a contract with a corporation which is merely ultra vires has
been fully executed by one of the parties so that the other party has
received benefits under it in either money, property or services, the
party who has performed may maintain an action upon the contract
and the other party cannot defeat the action by pleading that the con-
tract is ultra vires.15 Under this majority view, the one who has re-
ceived benefits by the other party's full performance is said to be es-
topped to raise the defense of ultra vires to an action on the contract.
It is noteworthy that in the Buice opinion the Tennessee Court spoke
of the contract itself becoming "enforceable." Perhaps Tennessee is
lining up with the majority of courts to permit an action on the con-
tract itself where one side has fully performed rather than limiting the
remedy to a quasi-contractual recovery for the money paid or loaned or
the value of the property delivered or services rendered under the
contract.
16
14. Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 301, 204 S.W. 758, 761 (1918);
Lewis Leonhardt & Co. v. Small & Co., 117 Tenn. 153, 164, 96 S.W. 1051, 1053
(1906); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 95 (Rev. ed. 1946); 7 FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 3467-3471 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931).
15. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 95 (Rev. ed. 1946); 7 FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS § 3473 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931).
16. For an earlier expression of the view by the Tennessee Court which
would support the majority view, see Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine, 107 Tenn. 151,
159, 64 S.W. 29, 31 (1901).
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